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I. INTRODUCTION
Advertising provides consumers with product information that
is useful in making choices between competing goods. In theory this
information helps to facilitate the rational allocation of resources
necessary in a free enterprise economy. For markets to operate effectively, consumers must have accurate information about the prod-
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ucts offered for sale.' Thus a major concern of the Federal Trade
Commission2 (FTC) has been the regulation of false or misleading
advertising.
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act directs the FTC
to prevent any "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce." ' 3 In interpreting this broad legislative mandate, the
courts generally have deferred to the FTC's findings of fact and
selection of remedies.' By granting first amendment protection to
commercial speech in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,2 however, the Supreme Court has
raised questions about the scope of the Commission's authority to
regulate advertising. Although the Court indicated that the first
amendment does not prevent the regulation of false or misleading
advertising,' the elevation of advertising to protected speech status
nonetheless creates uncertainty as to the extent of permissible regulation and the degree of judicial review. Whether specific practices
employed by the FTC are found to be unconstitutional will depend
largely upon subsequent interpretation of Virginia Pharmacy. Indeed, three recent circuit court opinions have cited Virginia
Pharmacy to support conclusions that the FTC's regulation of advertising should be closely scrutinized in order to prevent7 unnecessary interference with constitutionally protected speech.
The purpose of this Recent Development is to analyze these
circuit court decisions in light of Virginia Pharmacy. In providing
first amendment protection to commercial speech, the Court in
Virginia Pharmacy suggested a "degree of protection" approach,
which would allow the FTC to undertake more rigorous regulation
of false or misleading advertising than would be permitted in noncommercial cases. This Recent Development proposes that the
Commission's regulative efforts should receive a deferential level of
scrutiny from reviewing courts and should be upheld when reasona1.

See generally Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. EcoN. 213 (1961).

2. See generally Millstein, The Federal Trade Commission and False Advertising, 64
COLUM. L. REv. 439 (1964); Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: ConsumerProtectionand the Regulation

of Advertising, 90 HnAv. L. REv. 661 (1977); Thain, Advertising Regulation: The Contemporaiy FTC Approach, 1 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 349 (1973).
3.

15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976).

4. See notes 49-58 infra and accompanying text.
5. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
6.

Id. at 771-72, 771 n.24.

7. National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, [1977 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 61,751 (7th Cir. Nov. 29, 1977); Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749
(D.C. Cir. 1977); Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976); see notes 111-43 infra
and accompanying text.
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bly related to correcting the deception of consumers. Based on this
proposed standard of judicial review, the circuit courts have misinterpreted Virginia Pharmacyby assuming that the first amendment
requires the courts to substitute their judgment for that of the FTC.
I1.

A.

REGULATION OF ADVERTISING BY THE

FTC

The FTC's Statutory Power to Regulate Advertising

Congress first authorized federal regulation of advertising in
1914 by enacting the Federal Trade Commission Act.' The Commission's initial regulation of deceptive advertising was subsequently
restricted, however, by the Supreme Court's ruling that the FTC
could only regulate false advertising that adversely affected competition.'0 Congress responded with the Wheeler-Lea Act in 1938,"
providing the FTC with power over "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices" whenever deception of the public was involved, regardless of the effect on competition. 2 Although numerous critics have
questioned the effectiveness of the FTC,'3 Congress has continued
to expand the Commission's powers.' 4
Sections 5 and 12 of the Federal Trade Commission Act provide
the FTC with its major regulatory powers over advertising. Section
12 states that "[it shall be unlawful ... to disseminate, or cause
to be disseminated, any false advertisement ... for the purpose of
15
inducing . . .the purchase of food, drugs, devices or cosmetics.
This section, which has been narrowly applied to the specific advertising of food, drugs, devices, and cosmetics, contains special en8. Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, § 1, 38 Stat. 717 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1976)).
The Federal Trade Commission Act did not give the Commission specific power to regulate
advertising but rather authorized it to prevent unfair and deceptive trade practices.
9. Three of the five complaints issued by the FTC in its first year of operation were
directed at false advertising. See Millstein, supra note 2, at 451.
10. FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
11. Act of Mar. 21, 1938, ch. 49, § 4, 52 Stat. 111 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 52-55
(1976)).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976).
13. E. Cox, R. FELLMETH, & J. SCHULTZ, "THE NADER REPORT" ON THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION (1969) [hereinafter cited as Cox]; R. POSNER, REGULATION OF ADVERTISING BY THE
FTC (1973); E. ROCKEFELLER, DESK BOOK OF FTC PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 6 (2d ed. 1976).
14. The FTC's specific regulatory powers have been expanded through statutes such as
the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1461 (1976). For a comprehensive
list of these statutes see ROCKEFELLER, supra note 13, at 28-29, 28-29 nn.4-17. Amendments
to the Federal Trade Commission Act also have expanded the Commission's jurisdiction,
rule-making, and enforcement powers. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976), amending 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1970) (jurisdiction changed from "in commerce" to "in or affecting commerce"); 15 U.S.C.
§ 53 (1976), amending 15 U.S.C. § 53 (1970) (authority to seek injunctions); 15 U.S.C. § 57b
(1976) (authority to bring civil actions on behalf of consumers).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 52(a) (1976).
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forcement provisions for regulating the false advertising of these
goods. Section 5's broader statutory powers prevent any "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce."'" Neither the
statute nor its legislative history, however, specifically defines
"unfair or deceptive."' 7
The FTC has used this expansive legislative mandate to investigate various kinds of advertising;' 8 a partial listing includes advertising that is false,' 9 misleading,20 ambiguous, 2' deceptive, 2 unsubstantiated, 3 or directed toward vulnerable groups.24 In 1972 the
Supreme Court further broadened the Commission's powers by ruling in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. 25 that the FTC could attack
practices that neither deceive consumers nor threaten competition,
but are objectionable because of their unfair impact on consumers. 26
Thus the Commission's authority to regulate particular advertising
practices has gone largely unquestioned.Y Controversy has arisen
16. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976).
17. The legislative history of the Federal Trade Commission Act suggests that Congress
intended to provide the FTC with broad regulatory powers. Senator Thomas, in commenting
on § 5, stated that:
[Ujnfair competition, like fraud, is a creature of protean shapes. It assumes one attitude to-day and another to-morrow. As with fraud, so will it be with unfair competition.
In fraud there is a constant race between the rogue and the chancellor. In unfair competition there is going to be a constant race between the corporation and the commission
51 CONG. REc. 11,598 (1914).
18. For a detailed recent account of advertising regulations, see Pitofsky, supra note 2.
19. Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (finding that Listerine
mouthwash was not beneficial for colds and sore throats); see notes 123-33 infra and accompanying text.
20. Bantam Books, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 680 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 819 (1960)
(failure to inform consumers that books were abridged or retitled); Zenith Radio Corp. v.
FTC, 143 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1944) (misleading claims that radios could receive broadcasts from
Europe).
21. Murray Space Shoe Corp. v. FTC, 304 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1962) (ambiguous claims
about the therapeutic qualities of certain shoes).
22. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965) (use of plexiglass to which sand
had been applied in an advertisement claiming that shaving cream could shave "tough, dry,
sandpaper" in a single stroke); Campbell Soup Co., 77 F.T.C. 664 (1970) (placing marbles in
soup to give it a deceptively richer appearance).
23. Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972) (failure to substantiate claim that suntan lotion
contained a special ingredient that anesthetized nerves in sunburned skin).
24. FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304 (1934) (selling penny candy to children
by inducing them with possible prizes); Mattel, Inc., 79 F.T.C. 667 (1971) (using special
filming techniques to exaggerate the appearance and performance of "Hot Wheels" racing
cars).
25. 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
26. To date, the FTC has not made extensive use of the "unfairness doctrine." See
Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 684.
27. For a discussion of judicial deference to the Commission's finding that a certain
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instead over the types of remedies that the Commission may apply
to false or misleading advertising.
Remedies Applicable to False or Misleading Advertising
Upon determining that a party might be engaged in an unfair
or deceptive advertising or sales practice, the FTC may seek an
order "requiring such person, partnership or corporation to cease
and desist from using such method of competition or such act or
practice. '2 Although a cease and desist order normally requires a
formal adjudication of charges between the parties, approximately
seventy-five percent of the actions are settled informally by consent
orders that have the binding effect of a fully litigated disposition. 9
An agreement reached in this manner may take the form of an oral
promise or a written assurance of voluntary compliance.30 Consent
orders allow the defendant to assist in shaping the remedy and to
escape adverse publicity, and also permit the FTC to avoid the cost
of prolonged litigation while implementing its orders more quickly.
If an informal agreement is not reached, the FTC may file a
complaint against the respondent to obtain a formal cease and desist order. 31 A hearing is held by an administrative law judge who
must file an initial decision within ninety days of the receipt of all
evidence. This decision is appealable to the full Commission by
either party and the Commission's ruling may be appealed to a
United States court of appeals. 2 Thus a cease and desist order often
will not take effect until several years after the violation first occurs. 3 This delay, coupled with a sanction that does not become
effective until after a final decision is rendered, has been said to give
each violator "a free bite at the apple," 34 since the advertiser can
B.

activity constitutes an unfair or deceptive act, see Reich, Consumer Protection and the First
Amendment: A Dilemma for the FTC?, 61 MINN. L. REV. 705, 708-11 (1977).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b)(1976). See generally Note, The Limits of FTC Power to Issue
Consumer Protection Orders, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 496 (1972).
29.

F. KENT, LEGAL AND BUSINESS PROBLEMS OF THE ADVERTISING INDUSTRY 158 (1975).

30.

16 C.F.R. § 2.21 (1977).

31. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1976).
32. 16 C.F.R. §§ 3.51-3.55 (1977). Upon final adjudication, a party violating a cease and
desist order is subject to a civil penalty of up to $10,000 for every violation, with each day of
continuing failure to obey an order counting as a separate offense. 15 U.S.C. § 45(1) (1976).
33. See Cox, supra note 13, at 72. The most extreme example of this delay was a case
in which 149 hearings were held over the course of 16 years before the FTC finally compelled
Carter Products, Inc., to remove the references to "liver" in the name "Carter's Little Liver
Pills." Carter Products, Inc. v. FTC, 268 F.2d 461, 465 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884
(1959).
34. Note, "Corrective Advertising" Orders of the FederalTrade Commission, 85 HARV.
L. REV. 477, 483 (1971).
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acquire a delay profit by continuing to violate the Act until the
cease and desist order becomes final.
Because of the inadequacies of cease and desist orders, the FTC
recently has been granted additional powers by Congress and has
developed alternative remedies to regulate false and misleading
advertising. In 1973 the FTC was granted authority under section
13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act to seek preliminary
injunctions from the district courts.3 5 The FTC previously could
seek injunctive relief in section 12 cases, 36 but rarely used this power
because of the narrow scope of its application and the considerable
confusion over the standard of proof required by the courts.37 Under
section 13(b), the FTC may be granted a preliminary injunction
"[u]pon a proper showing that, weighing the equities and considering the Commission's likelihood of ultimate success, such action
would be in the public interest . . . . 3 This stringent standard of
proof suggests, however, that the FTC may continue to have difficulty in limiting an advertiser's "free bite at the apple" through the
39
use of injunctive relief
In conjunction with cease and desist orders, the FTC also has
required some advertisers guilty of unfair or deceptive acts to disclose publicly certain information about their products. These affirmative disclosure orders are not required because the advertisement's statements are false, but because it fails to state facts necessary for the consumer to make an intelligent selection. Upon receipt
of an affirmative disclosure order, the advertiser must either comply
with the order or cease advertising. An illustration of the use of
affirmative disclosure is provided by J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC,40 in
which the makers of Geritol were required to disclose that their
product was of no benefit to most people suffering from a general
"run-down feeling." 4' In order to sustain an affirmative disclosure
35. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1976). Halverson, The Federal Trade Commission's Injunctive
Powers Under the Alaskan Pipeline Amendments: An Analysis, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 872 (1975).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 53(a) (1976); Note, The FTC's Injunctive Authority Against False
Advertising of Food and Drugs, 75 MICH. L. REv. 745 (1977).
37. FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 673-74 (2d Cir. 1963); FTC v. National
Health Aids, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 340, 346 (D. Md. 1953). But see FTC v. National Comm'n
on Egg Nutrition, 517 F.2d 485, 489 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 919 (1976); FTC
v. Rhodes Pharmacal Co., 191 F.2d 744, 747-48 (7th Cir. 1951).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1976).
39. See FTC v. National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 517 F.2d at 488-89; FTC v. Simeon
Management Corp., 391 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
40. 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967).
41. Future Geritol advertisements were required to disclose that "in the great majority
of persons who experience such symptoms, these symptoms are not caused by a deficiency of
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order the FTC must demonstrate that a failure to disclose is misleading because the actual performance or quality of the product
2
does not comport with the claims made in the advertisement.
A recent remedy developed by the FTC that is similar to affirmative disclosure is the use of corrective advertising. 3 Affirmative
disclosure traditionally has been required only when the failure to
reveal specific facts in current advertisements might mislead future
consumers. Corrective advertising, on the other hand, requires certain disclosures based on the nature of past representations, regardless of whether the false or misleading advertisement is continued.4
Corrective advertising is promoted as a solution to the delay-profit
problem since compliance with the corrective advertising order
should offset profits arising from the continuation of deceptive advertising during the FTC proceedings.45 More importantly, these
orders are viewed as a solution to the residual-effect problem of
deceptive advertising whereby consumers who remember the advertising claim continue to be influenced by it after the advertising
campaign is over." Critics of corrective advertising have challenged
these orders as retrospective and punitive in nature and thus beyond
the statutory powers of the FTC." Prior to 1977, however, the courts
had not had the opportunity to address these criticisms because the
only corrective advertising orders issued by the FTC were either
proposed orders or were included as part of consent orders."
one or more of the vitamins contained in the preparation [Geritol] or by iron deficiency or
iron deficiency anemia;" and "for such persons the preparation will be of no benefit." Id. at
890.
42. Id. (quoting Alberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1950)). See also Ward
Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC, 276 F.2d 952 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 827 (1960) (manufacturer of purported baldness cure was required either to disclose that 95% of all cases of
baldness are not curable or to stop advertising its product as a cure for baldness).
43. See generallyCornfield, A New Approach to an Old Remedy: CorrectiveAdvertising
and the Federal Trade Commission, 61 IOWA L. REv. 693 (1976); Pitofsky, supra note 2, at
692-701; Thain, CorrectiveAdvertising: Theory and Cases, 19 N.Y.L.F. 1 (1973).
44. For example, in a case involving the misleading advertisement of sugar, the order
in Amstar Corp., 83 F.T.C. 659, 673 (1973), required the following disclosure:
Do you recall some of our past messages saying that Domino sugar gives you strength,
energy, and stamina? Actually, Domino is not a special or unique source of strength,
energy or stamina. No sugar is, because what you need is a balanced diet and plenty of
rest and exercise.
45. In Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 80 F.T.C. 975 (1972), which involved a consent
order incorporating a corrective message, the agreement provided that 25% of the advertising
budget for one year must be devoted to informing the public of past deception.
46. See Cornfield, supra note 43, at 707.
47. Id. at 708-13.
48. Id. at 707-08; Thain,supra note 43, at 2-17. But see notes 123-33 infra and accompanying text.
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C. Judicial Review of FTC Remedies
The courts generally have afforded the FTC the same broad
discretion in the shaping of remedies that it is allowed in determining whether a particular practice violates the Act.49 In Jacob Siegel
Co. v. FTC"' the Supreme Court overturned a court of appeals decision that had modified an FTC order requiring the defendant company to cease using a trade name the FTC had found to be deceptive. In remanding the case for further findings, the Court stressed
the great deference accorded the Commission's selection of remedies:
The Commission has wide discretion in its choice of a remedy deemed
adequate to cope with the unlawful practices in this area of trade and commerce. Here . . .judicial review is limited. It extends no further than to

ascertain whether the Commission made an allowable judgment in its choice
of the remedy .... Congress has entrusted it [the Commission] with the

administration of the Act and has left the courts with only limited powers of
review. The Commission is the expert body to determine what remedy is necessary to eliminate the unfair or deceptive trade practices which have been
disclosed. It has wide latitude for judgment and the courts will not interfere
except where the remedy selected has no reasonablerelation to the unlawful
practices found to exist. "

The "reasonable relation" test stated in Jacob Siegel has been applied repeatedly in subsequent cases reviewing the legality of a remedy selected by the FTC.12 The Supreme Court also has established
that a remedial order is not limited to the specific violations that
have occurred, but rather the FTC may take any steps necessary to
3
prevent circumvention of its orders.1
Additional language in the Jacob Siegel54 case, along with the
earlier FTC v. Royal Milling Co."5 decision, have been interpreted,
however, as creating a stringent "least drastic means" standard for
reviewing FTC remedies. Although both cases suggested that a remedy requiring the destruction of valuable business assets would not
49. See notes 18-26 supra and accompanying text.
50. 327 U.S. 608 (1946).
51. Id. at 611-13 (emphasis added).
52. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 394-95 (1965); FTC v. National Lead
Co., 352 U.S. 419, 428-29 (1957); FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952); Portwood v.
FTC, 418 F.2d 419, 424 (10th Cir. 1969); Waltham Watch Co. v. FTC, 318 F.2d 28, 32 (7th
Cir. 1963).
53. See FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952), in which the Court noted that
the FTC "cannot be required to confine its road block to the narrow lane that the transgressor
has traveled; it must be allowed effectively to close all roads to the prohibited goal, so that
its order may not be by-passed with impunity." See also FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380
U.S. 374, 394-95 (1965); FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 429 (1957).
54. 327 U.S. at 612.
55. 288 U.S. 212, 217 (1933).
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be upheld if less drastic means would accomplish the same result,5 6
the application of this test has been limited to the regulation of
long-established trade names. 5 Absent these conditions, federal
courts have sustained FTC orders prohibiting false or misleading
advertising without a showing that the remedy employed was the
least restrictive cure for the deception.', Thus the overriding trend
indicates judicial deference to the Commission's expertise in selecting the proper remedy in areas under its supervision. The current
validity of this deferential approach, however, has been placed in
issue by the recent extension of first amendment protections to
commercial speech.
IlI.

FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH

A.

The Commercial Speech Doctrine
(1)

Valentine v. Chrestensen

The first Supreme Court decision to address directly the question whether commercial speech receives first amendment protec0 in which the
tion 9 was Valentine v. Chrestensen,1
Court upheld an
antilitter ordinance that had been invoked to prohibit circulation of
handbills advertising free admission to a submarine. In a brief opin-

ion, devoid of analysis or citation to precedent, the Court concluded
that although the first amendment would forbid the banning of all
communication by handbill, it imposed no such restraint on the
governmental regulation of purely commercial advertising." In

holding that commercial advertising was unprotected by the first
56. 327 U.S. at 612; 288 U.S. at 217.
57. In Joseph Siegel the respondent had used the trade name for 13 years and in Royal
Milling for over 30 years. See Reich, supra note 27, at 713. See also Beneficial Corp. v. FTC,
542 F.2d 611, 619-20 (3d Cir. 1976).
58. See Reich, supra note 27, at 713.
59. For an account of earlier mail censorship cases, see 5 HoFsTRA L. REV. 655, 655-58
(1977).
Additional background sources on commercial speech and the first amendment include:
Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IowA L. REV. 1 (1976);
Meiklejohn, Commercial Speech and the FirstAmendment, 13 CAL. W.L. REV. 430 (1977);
Redish, The First Amendment in the Market Place: Commercial Speech and the Values of
Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1971); Rotunda, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1080; Note, Yes, FTC, There is a Virginia: The
Impact of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. on
the Federal Trade Commission's Regulation of Misleading Advertising, 57 B.U.L. REV. 833
(1977); Note, FirstAmendment Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. Cm. L. REV. 205 (1976).
60. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
61. Id. at 54.
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amendment,12 the Court in Valentine employed a "two-level" theory
of the first amendment, which classifies speech as either fully pro3
tected or wholly unprotected.1
Having established the commercial speech doctrine in
Valentine, the Court avoided applying it in subsequent cases. In
Breard v. Alexandria,4 the only major case to follow the Valentine
rationale, the Court upheld a conviction for violation of an ordinance prohibiting door-to-door solicitation of magazine subscriptions. Since Breard, however, the Court has either ignored the doctrine"' or has restricted the scope of its application. In New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,6 for example, a public appeal by the NAACP
for funds to combat the effects of alleged racial discrimination by
Alabama police was held protected by the first amendment notwithstanding the fact that it took the form of a commercial advertisement. The Supreme Court distinguished Valentine as involving
purely commercial advertisement, unlike the New York Times advertisement, which contained political information of public interest. 7 Thus the Court moved away from the strict nonprotection
approach to commercial speech and began to examine the actual
content of advertisements. The Court failed to address, however,
the Valentine holding that purely commercial advertising is wholly
unprotected by the first amendment.
(2) Erosion of the Commercial Speech Doctrine
In PittsburghPress Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Rights,6 a divided Court69 upheld a local ordinance prohibiting
62. The traditional view of the first amendment status of commercial advertising was
later noted by Chief Judge Bazelon in Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1101-02 (D.C. Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969):
Promoting the sale of a product is not ordinarily associated with any of the interests the
First Amendment seeks to protect. As a rule, it does not affect the political process, does
not contribute to the exchange of ideas, does not provide information on matters of
public importance, and is not, except perhaps for the ad-men, a form of individual selfexpression.
63. See Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L.
REv. 20, 30-33 (1975).
64. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
65. One notable comment about the Valentine decision was made by Justice Douglas
in Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513-14 (1958) (Douglas, J., concurring), in
which he stated: "The ruling was casual, almost off hand. And it has not survived reflection."
66. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
67. Id. at 266.
68. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
69. Justice Powell's majority opinion was joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall,
and Rehnquist; Chief Justice Burger and Justices Douglas, Stewart, and Blackmun each filed
dissents.
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newspapers from publishing separate columns of male and female
want ads. The Court initially held that the regulated want ads, as
proposals of possible employment, were classic examples of commercial speech,70 which the Court defined as speech that does no
more than propose a commercial transaction. 71 Having determined
that the want ads constituted commercial speech, the Court then
focused on the constitutionality of their regulation. Rather than
applying the commercial speech doctrine, the Court upheld the ordinance on the ground that the restrictions it imposed were aimed
at the advertisement's discriminatory hiring proposals, which were
themselves illegal. 72 The Court indicated, however, that the advertisements would have received some degree of first amendment protection if the commercial proposal had been legal.7 3 Despite the lack
of clarity of this dictum, it strongly suggested that commercial
speech might be afforded some constitutional protection. The dissenting opinions of Justices Douglas and Stewart went even further
in urging that Valentine be expressly overruled because it denied
first amendment protection for commercial speech.74
The attack upon the commercial speech doctrine continued in
Bigelow v. Virginia,75 in which the Court struck down on first
amendment grounds a Virginia statute under which a local newspaper had been convicted of publishing an advertisement for an abortion referral agency.76 In an opinion by Justice Blackmun, the Court
stated for the first time that constitutional protections were not
entirely inapplicable to paid commercial speech.77 In recognizing the
value of commercial information, the Court stressed that the
"relationship of speech to the marketplace of products or of services
does not make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas. '7 The Court
70.

413 U.S. at 385.

71.

Id.

72. Id. at 388. Justice Powell compared the advertising of sex-associated jobs with the
illegal advertisement of narcotics or prostitution.
73. The Court noted that: "Any First Amendment interest which might be served by
advertising an ordinary commercial proposal and which might arguably outweigh the governmental interest supporting the regulation is altogether absent when the commercial activity
itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising is incidential to a valid limitation on economic activity." Id. at 389.
74. Id. at 399, 401 (Douglas, J., & Stewart, J., dissenting).
75. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
76. The advertisement stated that abortions were legal in New York (they were then
illegal in Virginia) and that there was no residency requirement. It then set forth the conditions under which the referral agency would provide information and counseling for a fee. Id.
at 812.
77. Id. at 818.
78. Id. at 826.
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also questioned the validity of Valentine, intimating that it authorized only the "reasonable regulation" of the manner in which adver7
tisements could be distributed. 1
The Court in Bigelow declined, however, to establish the proposition that commercial speech is fully protected by the first amendment. Instead the Court stated that "commercial advertising enjoys
a degree of protection,"8 0 and that courts must balance first amendment concerns against the governmental interests asserted in support of the regulation .8 Thus, while the decision provided some first
amendment protection for commercial speech, it also recognized the
states' legitimate interest in regulating advertising.82 In adopting a
balancing approach, however, the Court failed to define clearly the
extent to which the first amendment allows the regulation of adver83
tising.
B.

The Virginia Pharmacy Decision

In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,84 individual consumers and consumer interest
groups challenged the constitutionality of a Virginia statute prohibiting licensed pharmacists from engaging in price advertising for
prescription drugs. Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun concluded that advertisers have a first amendment right to speak the
truth in commercial advertising, and that the public has a corresponding right to receive this information.1 In reviewing the history
of the commercial speech doctrine, the Court once again distinguished Valentine, characterizing it as a simplistic approach that
was rarely applied." The Court then stressed the strong consumer
interest in the free flow of commercial information, stating that
79. Id. at 819-20. The Court stressed that Valentine does not support the "proposition
that advertising is unprotected per se."
80. Id. at 821.
81. Id. at 826. The Court further noted that: "The diverse motives, means, and messages of advertising may make speech 'commercial' in widely varying degrees. We need not
decide here the extent to which constitutional protection is afforded commercial advertising
under all circumstances and in the face of all kinds of regulation." Id.
82. In balancing these interests, the Court likened the advertisements before it to those
in the New York Times decision, indicating that the Virginia statute interfered with the flow
of information that was of vital public interest as opposed to merely commercial transactions.
Id. at 821-22. Moreover, the Court did not feel that the statute was relevant to the state's
legitimate interest in maintaining the quality of medical care provided within its borders. Id.
at 827.
83. Id. at 825.
84. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
85. Id. at 756-57.
86. Id. at 758-59.
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informed decision making is as essential to the free market economy
as it is to the political process.87 In light of this reasoning, the Court
ruled that speech that does no more than propose a commercial
transaction is not wholly outside the protection of the first amendment." Because it found the advertising in question directly protected by the first amendment, the Court rejected any balancing
against governmental interest as had occurred in Bigelow. 9 The
Court noted, however, that the regulation of some forms of commercial speech is permissible. Thus regulation of time, place and manner of advertising, false and misleading advertising, advertising of
illegal acts, and advertising in the broadcast media might all be
constitutionally permissible."
The impact of VirginiaPharmacy on the regulation of advertising is significant for several reasons. In ruling that commercial
speech that merely proposes a commercial transaction is protected
by the first amendment, the Court disregarded the suggestions of
earlier cases9" that only commercial speech containing material of
public interest or editorial concern should receive constitutional
protection. 2 Thus advertisements presenting a purely commercial
proposal are now protected by the first amendment. The Virginia
Pharmacydecision indicated, however, that the FTC's regulation of
false or misleading advertising is not prohibited by the granting of
first amendment protection to commercial speech.93 Since deceptive
advertising is of questionable informational value, its regulation is
consistent with the Court's interest in aiding consumers by promoting the free flow of truthful information. Moreover, because inaccurate advertising has only marginal first amendment value, the gov87. Id. at 763-64.
88. Id. at 761-62.
89. The Court cursorily stated: "[T]he choice among these alternative approaches is
not ours to make or the Virginia Assembly's. It is precisely the kind of choice, between the
dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available,
that the First Amendment makes for us." Id. at 770.
90. Id. at 770-73. The Court noted that this list of the types of advertising that are
subject to regulation is not exclusive.
91. See note 67 supra and accompanying text; note 82 supra.
92. 425 U.S. at 760-61.

93. See note 90 supra and accompanying text. In listing the types of commercial speech
regulations that are permissible, the Court stated:

Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake.
. Obviously, much commercial speech is not provably false, or even wholly false, but
only deceptive or misleading. We foresee no obstacle to a State's dealing effectively with

this problem. The First Amendment as we construe it today, does not prohibit the State
from insuring that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well as freely.
425 U.S. at 771-72.
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ernment may not be required in all cases to demonstrate a legitimate interest sufficient to justify its regulation. 4 Even the most
fraudulent advertisement, however, may contain some truthful information and thus the regulation of false or misleading advertising
must not be allowed to mute completely the presentation of constitutionally protected speech.
In discussing the extent of regulation allowed by the first
amendment, the Court in VirginiaPharmacyindicated that false or
misleading speech might permissibly be regulated with greater rigor
than would similar false statements of fact in a noncommercial
setting. 5 The Court justified this "different degree of protection"
approach 6 on two grounds. First, the greater objectivity of commercial speech makes advertising claims more readily verifiable
than news reporting or political commentary. 8 Perhaps more importantly, the Court suggested that because advertisers are greatly
motivated by the desire for commercial profit, stricter regulation of
false advertising creates a less severe chilling effect than does the
regulation of noncommercial speech. 9 Thus the greater objectivity
and hardiness of commercial speech reduce the need to tolerate
inaccuracy. In attempting to separate and prohibit the false and
94. In National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. 84, 198 (1976), the FTC interpreted the Virginia Pharmacy decision by stating:
[W]e doubt that the Bigelow case compels the application of a balancing of interests
test in each particular case before any regulation whatsoever may be applied to misleading commercial speech. That balance has already been struck on a categorical basis, a
fact recognized by the Supreme Court in Virginia Board of Pharmacy if not in Bigelow
itself.

95. In describing this permissible regulation, the Court noted:
In concluding that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protection, we have
not held that it is wholly undifferentiable from other forms. There are common-sense
differences between speech that does "no more than propose a commercial transaction,"
...and other varieties. Even if the differences do not justify the conclusion that commercial speech is valueless, and thus subject to complete suppression by the State, they
nonetheless suggest that a different degree of protection is necessary to insure that the
flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired.
425 U.S. at 771 n.24.

96. See note 90 supra and accompanying text. Professor Meiklejohn acknowledges the
"degree of protection" approach but argues that all commercial speech, including false or
misleading advertising, should receive full first amendment protection. See Meiklejohn,
supra note 59, at 443-50. See also Note, 57 B.U.L. REV., supra note 59, at 841-42, in which
the author recognizes this different level of constitutional protection, but argues that it is

inconsistent with the Court's broad application of first amendment rights.
97. Generally, false or misleading statements in noncommercial, political speech are
given a stringent degree of first amendment protection because of the considerable difficulty
in determining whether the statement is in fact untruthful and because of the danger of
stifling free debate. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-41 (1974).
98. 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
99. Id.
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misleading elements in commercial speech from those that are accurate and thus protected, governmental entities may therefore proceed more aggressively and with less exacting precision than would
be required of regulative schemes affecting noncommercial speech.
Although this rationale suggests that a less exacting degree of
judicial scrutiny is appropriate in reviewing governmental regulation of deceptive advertising, the Court failed to elaborate on the
precise standard of review that is required. 0 0 In suggesting that
deceptive commercial speech might be more rigorously regulated
than similar noncommercial speech, the Court noted that it might
be appropriate to require that an advertisement appear in a particular form or include additional information and warnings "as are
necessary to prevent its being deceptive."'' While this statement
clearly authorizes the use of remedial advertising, it may be interpreted as requiring that such remedial measures be "necessary."
The lack of additional language in the opinion supporting or defining this vague term, however, raises serious doubt that the Court
02
intended it to be used as a standard of constitutional review.
C.

Recent Supreme Court Decisions

In two recent decisions the Supreme Court has followed
Virginia Pharmacyin extending first amendment protection to commercial speech, but has not directly confronted the issue of the
3
degree to which false or misleading advertising may be regulated.
100. The Court also failed to provide an explicit definition of commercial speech. For a
discussion of the various ways courts and commentators have approached this problem, see
Note, First Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New Constitutional
Doctrine, 44 U. Cm.L. REv. 205 (1976).
101. 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. In support of this statement, the Court cited Banzhafv. FCC,
405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), and United States v. 95 Barrels of Vinegar, 265 U.S. 438
(1924).
102. For a further discussion suggesting that the Court did not create a "necessary"
standard of review, see notes 149-51 infra and accompanying text.
103. In another recent decision, a plurality of the Court purported to follow the Virginia
Pharmacy"degree of protection" approach by suggesting that the first amendment afforded
a lesser degree of protection to sexually explicit material than to other forms of protected
expression. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). It is important to
note, however, that the degree of protection approach employed by the plurality was expressly
rejected by five members of the Court. 427 U.S. at 73 n.1, 84-88. More important for the
purposes of this Recent Development, the "degree of protection" theory advbcated in Mini
Theatres is entirely different from that suggested in Virginia Pharmacy. In Virginia
Pharmacy the Court initially determined that because of the need for accurate consumer
information in the market place, commercial speech was afforded protection by the first
amendment. Having made that determination, the Court then suggested that commercial
speech, because of its greater objectivity and comparatively hardy nature, requires less protective safeguarding than expression in noncommercial areas. 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. Although
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In Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro,"I the Court
unanimously held that an ordinance prohibiting the posting of "For
Sale" signs on residential property in order to prevent the flight of
white residents from the township violated the first amendment.
Finding no constitutional distinctions between advertisements designed to sell realty and those for prescription drugs, the Court
relied on Virginia Pharmacyin holding that this restriction on the
free flow of truthful information constituted a first amendment violation. 10 5 The Court suggested, however, that different constitutional questions would have been raised had the challenged law
regulated false or misleading signs. This difference would stem from
the lesser degree of protection required to insure the unimpaired
flow of accurate information in the commercial setting. 6
In the recent case of Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,"7 the Supreme Court again extended protection to commercial speech in
holding that a blanket suppression of attorney advertising violated
the first amendment. 8 The Court limited its ruling, however, findthe Court will allow more rigorous regulation, the ultimate effect on protected commercial
speech, because of its hardy nature, will be no more chilling than the deterrent effect that
less rigorous regulation has on noncommercial speech.
The approach adopted in Mini Theatres is dramatically different. In Mini Theatres the
plurality apparently concludes that because there is a "less vital interest" represented by the
exhibition of sexually explicit materials than by the dissemination of ideas with "social and
political significance," state and local governments may place greater restrictions on the
former. 427 U.S. at 61. This analysis suggests that the first amendment itself affords less
protection to certain types of expression considered to be, presumably by majority consensus,
of social and political insignificance. In essence, the plurality reasons that since the constitution affords a lesser degree of protection, the Court will allow greater governmental restriction. Because the plurality found sexual expression to be of lower social value, it concluded
that less constitutional protection was in fact afforded and that greater regulation was permissible.
Unlike Virginia Pharmacy, the greater regulation permitted in Mini Theatres will produce a more severe chilling effect on protected expression than the Court would allow in areas
considered more socially or politically valuable. As the dissenting opinion forcefully notes,
the plurality's approach allows "selective interference with protected speech whose content
is thought to produce distasteful effects" and permits the right of free expression to be
"defined and circumscribed by popular opinion." Id. at 85, 86. Such an approach does indeed
ride "roughshod over cardinal principals of First Amendment law." Id. at 86.
104. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
105. Id. at 96-97. The respondents attempted to distinguish Virginia Pharmacy by
arguing that the ordinance involved a time, place, or manner restriction and therefore the
Court should use something less than a strict scrutiny standard for reviewing the regulations.
The Court found, however, that the ordinance forbade only realty advertising and thus was
directed at the content of the signs, not their time, place, or manner. Id. at 93-94.
106. Id. at 98.
107. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
108. Id. at 383. The Court found that both the Virginia Pharmacy statute and the
Arizona Bar's disciplinary rule prohibiting attorney advertising served "to inhibit the free
flow of commercial information and to keep the public in ignorance." Id. at 365.
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ing constitutional protection only for the advertisement of routine
legal services.' 9 Moreover, the Court noted that its decision did not
restrict the regulation of certain types of commercial speech, including the false or misleading advertising of attorney services.""
The Supreme Court cases decided since Virginia Pharmacy
have either directly or implicitly acknowledged the "degree of protection" approach, which allows a comparatively rigorous regulation
of certain types of advertising. None of these decisions, however,
have attempted to elaborate the proper constitutional standard
against which such regulation is to be tested. The absence of a clear
standard of review has had a significant impact on recent circuit
court decisions that have examined FTC remedial orders imposing
restraints on false or misleading advertisement.
IV.

RECENT JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE

FTC's

REGULATION OF ADVERTISING

A.

Beneficial Corp. v. FTC

Three months after the Virginia Pharmacy case was decided,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Beneficial Corp. v. FTC"'
overturned an FTC cease and desist order"' that prohibited a loan
company from using a misleading advertising slogan." 3 In upholding
the FTC's finding that the commercial loan slogan was misleading,
the court indicated that whether an advertisement is misleading
109. Id. at 372. Bates involved an advertisement by a legal clinic that performed routine
legal services such as uncontested divorces and simple adoptions for a modest fee to persons
of moderate income. The Court expressed the concern, however, that certain professional
services are too complex to be presented, as to either quality or price, in a manner normally
found in commercial advertising.
110. Id. at 383-84.
111. 542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977).
112. Beneficial Corp., 86 F.T.C. 119 (1975).
113. Having found that most of its tax service customers received yearly tax refunds,
Beneficial developed a loan program offering an "instant tax refund." This program, however,
was merely Beneficial's normal loan service based on the credit worthiness of the borrower.
The Commission found that the use of the copyrighted phrase "instant tax refund" constituted an unfair and deceptive trade practice and thus violated § 5 of the FTC Act. The

Commission concluded:
The early Instant Tax Refund advertising is, on its face, totally misleading about
the true nature of Beneficial's offer. Instead of making clear that Beneficial is simply
offering its everyday loan service, the advertising implies that Beneficial will give a
special cash advance to income tax preparation customers with a government refund
due, in the amount of their refund. The natural impression, since the Instant Tax Refund
is stressed as exclusive and special is that this cash advance is different from a normal
consumer loan.
542 F.2d at 617.
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more closely resembles a finding of fact than a conclusion of law."'
Thus the Court declined to second guess the Commission's find1 5
ing. 1
In its review of the Commission's remedial order, however, the
court took a less deferential approach. While acknowledging that it
ordinarily must defer to the FTC's exercise of discretion in framing
remedies,"' the court cited Virginia Pharmacyin asserting that the
regulation of commercial speech, like other forms of first amendment expression, must be carefully scrutinized. ' 7 The court also
placed substantial emphasis on the Jacob Siegel-Royal Milling
"least drastic means" reasoning" 8 to support the proposition that
the FTC must not abuse its discretion in ordering the excision of
trade names and other valuable business assets from advertising."'
Based on this rationale, the court adopted a standard of review
requiring that the remedy go "no further in imposing a prior restraint on protected speech than is reasonably necessary to accomplish the remedial objective of preventing the violation."' 2 Applying
this standard, the court closely scrutinized the Commission's deci2
sion and held that the FTC had abused its remedial discretion.' '
The court suggested that qualifying language could be used in the
2
advertisement to avoid the inherent deception found by the FTC.'1
114. Id. at 617.
115. Id. at 618.
116. See notes 49-58 supra and accompanying text.
117. 542 F.2d at 618-19.
118. See notes 54-57 supra and accompanying text.
119. 542 F.2d at 619-20. The court rejected the Commission's attempts to differentiate
between the long-established trade names found in the Jacob Siegel and Royal Milling cases,
and the advertising slogan used by Beneficial.
120. Id. at 619. The court supported this statement by citing United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968); New Jersey State Lottery Comm'n v. United States, 491 F.2d 219
(3d Cir. 1974); and Veterans & Reservists v. Regional Comm'r of Customs, 459 F.2d 676 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 933 (1972).
121. 542 F.2d at 620.
122. One proposed statement suggested by the court read: "Beneficial's everyday loan
service can provide to regularly qualified borrowers an Instant Tax Refund Anticipation Loan
whether or not the borrower uses our tax service." Id. at 619. In offering this example, the
court rejected the FTC's explicit finding that no qualifying language could properly dispel
the deception inherent in Beneficial's advertising slogan. On administrative appeal, the Commission had concluded:
[S]ince its inception in 1969, the Instant Tax Refund phrase has deceived continuously,
and Beneficial's repeated efforts to explain it have not cured the false impression it
leaves. Beneficial's inability to remedy the deception, which persists even in the qualifying phrase it offers. . . confirms what we believe to be obvious. No brief language is equal
to the task of explaining the Instant Tax Refund slogan, for the phrase is inherently
contradictory to the truth of Beneficial's offer.
Id. at 622.
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B. Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC
In Warner-LambertCo. v. FTC,'1 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit upheld the Commission's first litigated
' which required the manufacturer of
corrective advertising order, 24
Listerine mouthwash to disclose in future advertisements that its
product would not help to prevent colds or sore throats.'2 5 The court
found substantial evidence supporting the FTC's ruling that advertisements portraying Listerine as an effective cold remedy were
false. In determining the validity of the corrective order, however,
the court focused on three major areas: the legislative history of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, the first amendment protection
afforded commercial speech, and the judicial precedent supporting
corrective advertising.'26 In its first amendment analysis, the court
cited Virginia Pharmacy for the proposition that the first amendment presented no obstacle to the regulation of false or misleading
advertising.'1 In a supplemental opinion on the first amendment
question, '2 the court reaffirmed its view, stating that the corrective
advertising order was likely to have only a minimal chilling effect.
Furthermore, this regulation would not burden the free flow of
truthful information because, without the corrective message, the
advertisements would continue to mislead the public.' 9
Despite this acceptance of corrective advertising as a proper
FTC remedy, the court developed a more stringent standard of review for examining the constitutional impact of the Commission's
remedial order. The court cited the Beneficial decision in stating
that the FTC has a special responsibility "to order corrective advertising only if the restriction inherent in its order is no greater than
123. 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
124. See notes 43-48 supra and accompanying text.
125. 562 F.2d at 762-64. The court ordered that these corrective advertisements were
to be continued until Warner-Lambert spent an amount equalling the average annual Listerine advertising budget during the past ten years, approximately $10,000,000 according to FTC
estimates.
126. The court rejected the arguments that corrective advertising orders were retrospective or punitive in nature and adopted a standard for the imposition of corrective advertising
that required two factual inquiries: "(1) did Listerine's advertisements play a substantial role
in creating or reinforcing in the public's mind a false belief about the product? and (2) would
this belief linger on after the false advertising ceases?" Id. at 762.
127. Id. at 758. The court supported this statement by noting the Supreme Court's
"different degree of protection" language.
128. Id. at 768-71.
129. Id. at 770. The court again supported this statement by referring to Virginia
Pharmacy'ssuggestion that commercial speech may not require the same degree of protection
as other forms of speech. Rather, the court stated, "the opposite conclusion seems the more
appropriate one." Id.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:349

necessary to serve the interest involved." 1 The court also suggested
that the first amendment might require that the regulation be the
"least restrictive means" of achieving the governmental objective.' 3 ,
Applying these standards, the court upheld the vast majority of the
FTC's decision, but deleted a confessional preamble to the correc-

tive advertisement 3 ' which indicated that the disclosure was
"contrary to prior advertising."'
3

C. National Commission on Egg Nutrition v. FTC
In the recent case of National Commission on Egg Nutritionv.
FTC, 34 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an FTC cease
and desist order that prohibited an advertiser from making false
claims about the relationship between egg consumption and heart
disease, 3 but modified a companion order requiring the affirmative
disclosure of specific medical evidence. 3 The court deferred to the
Commission's finding that the advertising claims were false, acknowledging the FTC's special expertise in the area of advertising
regulation. 13 In upholding the cease and desist order, the court rejected the advertiser's contention that the first amendment requires
that a commercial misrepresentation on a controversial public issue
be governed by the same standards that apply in cases involving
libel of public figures.13s The court also indicated that the Supreme
130. Id. at 758.
131. Id. at 768-69.
132. Id. at 763. The Commission's corrective order required the advertisements to state
that "contrary to prior advertising, Listerine will not prevent colds or sore throats or lessen
their severity." The FTC argued that the preamble was required in order to attract attention
that a correction was forthcoming.
133. Id. The court indicated that the preamble would be required only if the advertiser
deliberately deceived the public.
134. [1977 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 61,751 (7th Cir. Nov. 29, 1977).
135. The FTC order barred the National Commission on Egg Nutrition (NCEN), an
association of egg producers formed to counter anticholesterol attacks on eggs, from running
false and misleading advertisements that claimed there existed no scientific evidence relating
egg consumption to an increased risk of heart disease. Id. at 73,096.
136. In future advertisements involving the relationship between egg consumption and
heart disease, the FTC ordered NCEN to disclose that "many medical experts believe that
increased consumption of dietary cholesterol, including that in eggs, may increase the risk of
heart disease." Id.
137. Id. at 73,097. The court had earlier granted a temporary injunction against NCEN
to cease its allegedly false advertising campaign during the pendency of the Commission's
administrative proceeding, subject to the condition that NCEN not be prohibited from
"making a fair representation of its side of the controversy." FTC v. National Comm'n on
Egg Nutrition, 517 F.2d 485, 489 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 919 (1976).
138. [1977 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
61,751 at 73,098-99. NCEN
argued that the standard formulated in New York Times, that a statement is actionable only
if made with deliberate or reckless disregard of the truth, should be applied.
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Court's concern in Virginia Pharmacy with the regulation of false
and misleading advertising' 9 suggests that commercial speech be
broadly defined to include "false claims as to the harmlessness of
the advertiser's product asserted for the purpose of persuading
14
members of the reading public to buy the product.""
Turning to the affirmative disclosure order, however, the court
cited Beneficial for the proposition that the "First Amendment does
not permit a remedy broader than that which is necessary to prevent
deception."'' In applying this constitutional standard, the court
held that the Commission's disclosure order was overbroad and
stated that in most advertisements involving the egg consumption42
heart disease controversy, a less severe disclosure would suffice.
The advertiser would be required to print the more stringent FTC
statement only if its advertisement made representations
as to the
4 3
state of available evidence concerning the controversy.
V.

COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS OF RECENT JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS

A.

Establishment of a Standard of Judicial Review

The three circuit court cases'44 have indicated in varying ways
that allowing the Commission to regulate false or misleading advertising is consistent with the constitutional protection afforded commercial speech in the Virginia Pharmacy decision.'45 In reviewing
the scope of the FTC's remedial orders, however, the courts have
seemingly adopted the "as are necessary" phrase from Virginia
139. The court cited Virginia Pharmacy as expressly recognizing that the first amendment did not interfere with the government's dealing effectively with the problem of false or
misleading advertising. Id. at 73,098.
140. Id. at 73,099.
141. Id. at 73,100. The court also stated that the same standard would be applied to
corrective advertising orders designed to correct the efforts of past deception.
142. Id. at 73,095, 73,100. The court's modified affirmative disclosure order required
that whenever NCEN represents in its advertisements that eating eggs will not increase the
risk of heart disease or makes any representation concerning the relationship between egg
consumption and heart disease, it must disclose "that there is a controversy among the
experts and NCEN is presenting its side of the controversy."
143. Id. at 73,100.
144. This article has focused on the first amendment restriction imposed by Virginia
Pharmacy on the FTC's regulation of advertising. In the recent case of Chrysler Corp. v. FTC,
561 F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir. 1977), the court modified an FTC cease and desist order involving
the deceptive advertisement of auto gas mileage. In reaching its decision, however, the court
ignored the first amendment issues posed by VirginiaPharmacyand instead emphasized that
the violations were unintentional and not continuing.
145. The acknowledgement of this fact has ranged from the suggestion in WarnerLambert that the Supreme Court has proposed a "degree of protection" approach to provide
for the regulation of false or misleading advertising, to the Beneficial court's general sidestepping of the issue.
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Pharmacy"' and have developed standards of constitutional review
requiring the remedy to be "reasonably necessary," "no greater than
necessary," or "no broader than that which is necessary.' 4 7 Although the extent of the courts' actual intervention in these cases
has varied greatly, the courts apparently are utilizing a strict scrutiny standard of review that requires the least drastic remedy possible for obtaining the government's objective. "8
A close reading of Virginia Pharmacy strongly suggests, however, that the phrase "as are necessary" was not intended to indicate the proper standard of review. "Necessary" implies a strict
scrutiny standard in which the regulation must be the least restrictive means available. In FTC v. Royal Milling Co.," 9 for example,
the Court used a "reasonably necessary" standard to examine
closely whether the regulation of a company's trade name, a business asset receiving special consideration, 50 was accomplished in
the least drastic manner possible. This strict degree of review,
though traditionally applied in cases affecting first amendment expression, is plainly inconsistent with Virginia Pharmacy's finding
that deceptive commercial speech may be more rigorously regulated
than inaccurate expression in the noncommercial setting. Furthermore, the cases the Court cited after the "as are necessary" phrase
do not support its adoption as a standard of review, but rather
indicate that the government in the past has had the power to
5
regulate the content of commercial speech. '
That Virginia Pharmacy did not establish a strict standard of
review is implicit in Beneficial. The Beneficial court did not purport
to rely on Virginia Pharmacy but instead justified its standard of
review by citing a series of cases involving first amendment questions that are totally distinct from those associated with commercial
speech. 52 The court further supported its strict scrutiny approach
by emphasizing the similarities between Beneficial's advertising
slogan and the trade names protected in the Jacob Siegel-Royal
146. See note 101 supra and accompanying text.
147. See notes 120, 130, & 141 supra and accompanying text.
148. See note 131 supra and accompanying text. Former FTC Commissioner Philip
Elman, speaking at a conference of the Food and Drug Law Institute, stated that the recent
extension of freedom of speech protection to commercial speech will require government
regulators to use the least restrictive method of regulation possible. ANrrRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) No. 837, at A-7 (Nov. 3, 1977).
149. 288 U.S. 212, 217 (1932).
150. See notes 54-57 supra and accompanying text.
151. See note 101 supra.
152. See note 120 supra.
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Milling line of cases. 53 Thus, although Beneficial applied a strict
scrutiny review to the regulation of commercial speech, its holding
may have been based primarily on the special protection afforded
trade names. This contention is given further credence by the adop1 54
tion in Beneficial of the standard of review used in Royal Milling.
The confusion created by the Beneficial decision is reflected in
the Warner-Lambert and National Egg cases. Both cases broadly
deferred to the Commission's findings that the advertisements were
false or misleading. Similarly, the court in Warner-Lambertupheld
the Commission's first contested corrective advertising order, and
the National Egg decision adopted a broad definition of the type of
false or misleading advertising that can be regulated under Virginia
Pharmacy. Both courts, however, relied upon Beneficial in establishing stringent standards for reviewing the FTC's remedial orders.
In contrast to Beneficial, though, the latter holdings only modified
the Commission's decisions and did not overrule them. Thus, not
only is the reasoning supporting the strict scrutiny standards questionable, but the manner in which the circuit courts have applied
these tests has been inconsistent.
The utilization of a strict scrutiny standard for reviewing FTC
regulation of false or misleading advertising presents serious problems. In addition to the obvious restraints that increased judicial
intervention will place on the Commission's ability to prevent deceptive advertising, this intervention necessitated by use of the
strict scrutiny standard, and the factual complexity of the cases,
will also add to general court costs, overcrowding, and delays. Similarly, the courts will be confronted with the burdensome task of
examining voluminous amounts of economic, consumer, and product data produced by these complex situations. Moreover, if in
adopting these standards of review, the courts' primary concern is
constitutionally safeguarding the free flow of truthful information, 55'
there is no persuasive reason why the Commission's fact finding
should receive more deference than does its selection of remedies. 5 '
In both cases, the rationale behind judicial deference is that the
Commission's greater expertise makes it the more appropriate
forum for resolution. If the Court undertakes strict scrutiny of remedies, deference to findings of fact upon which remedies are based
serves no logical purpose. Thus the courts may feel compelled to
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determine whether the advertisement is actually false or misleading. This intervention, if adopted, would logically extend to the fact
finding and remedial orders of other agencies regulating advertising,
such as the Federal Communications Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Finally, because strict scrutiny
standards have been applied inconsistently in recent decisions,
there is no indication that future courts will develop a more uniform
approach.
B. A ProposedAlternative
As an alternative to the strict judicial scrutiny suggested by the
circuit courts, this Recent Development proposes that the courts
adopt a more limited scope of review, intervening only when the
Commission's remedial order is not reasonably related to correcting
the unlawful practice found to exist. This alternative comports with
the suggestion presented in Virginia Pharmacy that false or misleading advertising should receive a "different degree of protection"
than similar expression in the noncommercial area.' By preserving
the FTC's ability to regulate deceptive advertising effectively, this
approach also supports the first amendment's concern with the free
flow of accurate commercial information. Moreover, the proposed
standard is consistent with the Supreme Court's previous review of
FTC decisions, which placed special emphasis on the Commission's
expertise in areas such as the regulation of advertising.'58 A less
intrusive standard also will provide for more consistent rulings by
the circuit courts.
This alternative standard of review does not propose that the
courts adopt a complete "hands-off" approach to FTC decisions.
Rather, VirginiaPharmacy'sconcern with the constitutional protection of truthful commercial information indicates that judicial intervention may be required if the Commission's remedial order is
excessively vague or does not directly relate to the particular false
or misleading advertisement found to exist. If the regulation is directed at a specific deceptive advertisement or series of advertisements, however, and the FTC has presented sufficient evidence to
support the reasonableness of its remedial order, the courts should
defer to the Commission's decision. Applying this standard to the
Beneficial case, for example, the court should have upheld the Commission's cease and desist order as a reasonable means of preventing
the dissemination of a deceptive advertisement, especially in light
157.
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of the Commission's finding that no qualifying language could adequately correct the advertisement's deceptive qualities. 15
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has suggested a "degree of protection"
approach to reconcile the first amendment protection of commercial
speech with the need to effectively regulate false or misleading advertising. In so doing, however, the Court has failed to establish
clearly the judicial standard of review appropriate in examining
regulative measures. In the absence of adequate guidance, several
circuit court decisions have adopted an unjustified standard of strict
judicial scrutiny. The continued use of this standard by the circuit
courts in reviewing FTC decisions will present increasing institutional problems for the courts and will seriously undermine the
Commission's ability to protect consumers through the regulation
of deceptive advertising. To avoid these consequences, the courts
should employ a more deferential standard of review, intervening
only in cases in which the FTC's regulation is not reasonably related
to preventing deception of the public.
ROBERT D. ECKINGER
159. See note 122 supra.

